LAN TABUR: Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah
Journal homepage: https://lan-tabur.unikhams.ac.id/index.php/LT

Enforcement-Prevention Asymmetry in State Financial Accountability: Empirical Evidence of Risk Management Decoupling with an Islamic Ethical Perspective

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ARTICLE HISTORY

Received:
03 April 2026
Revised
15 June 2026
Accepted:
09 July 2026
Online available:
15 July 2026

Keywords:
Enforcement-Prevention Asymmetry, Risk Management Decoupling, State Financial Accountability, Ceremonial Isomorphism, Internal Auditor Capability, Ethical Governance

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ABSTRACT

Introduction: Indonesia's post-pandemic economy demands increasingly higher state financial accountability to safeguard public wealth (hifz al-mal); however, a paradox emerges as governance infrastructure becomes more comprehensive while the Corruption Perception Index declines and corruption cases have increased during 2020–2023. This study aims to analyze the effects of corruption control effectiveness, Government Internal Control System maturity, risk management, and internal auditor capability on state financial accountability through an Islamic ethical governance lens.
Methods: A mixed-method convergent design was employed, combining quantitative panel data regression using the Fixed Effect Model on 81 ministries/agencies for the 2021–2024 period (N = 324) with qualitative analysis based on in-depth interviews with six key informants from key oversight institutions.
Results: The findings indicate that internal auditor capability, internal control system maturity, and corruption control effectiveness have positive and significant effects on accountability, whereas risk management shows no significant effect. Qualitative results confirm the dominance of enforcement mechanisms and reveal that risk management practices remain siloed and compliance-driven, highlighting a phenomenon of ethical decoupling.
Conclusion: These findings demonstrate an enforcement-prevention asymmetry, where mechanisms based on active monitoring and sanctions are more effective than preventive system-based approaches. From an ethical governance perspective, this condition reflects the limited internalization of accountability values such as amanah (trust), indicating that accountability remains externally driven resembling formal hisbah (external enforcement)—rather than intrinsically embedded. Strengthening public financial governance therefore requires not only formal institutional improvements but also the integration of ethical responsibility and anti-israf (anti-wastefulness) behavior to achieve more substantive and sustainable accountability.

e-ISSN: 2716-2605, p-ISSN 2721-0677
DOI: https:// https://doi.org/10.53515/lt.v8i1.180

1. Introduction

State financial management in Indonesia faces increasingly complex pressures amid global and domestic economic dynamics. Inflationary pressures, energy crises driven by geopolitical conflicts, and post-pandemic economic recovery needs have compelled the government to optimize the role of the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN) as an instrument of stabilization, distribution, and economic transformation acceleration. The Indonesian Economic Report (2024) affirms that the 2020–2023 period focused on crisis management and economic recovery, while 2024 was directed toward sustainable fiscal reform. These conditions demand state financial management that is increasingly accountable, transparent, and results-oriented.

In alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030 commitments, the government is required to manage fiscal risks effectively and ensure targeted budget allocation (Sholihah, 2024). The SDGs integration principle emphasizes interconnections among social, economic, environmental, and governance dimensions (Davila & Hills, 2018). However, the magnitude of funding needs and escalating post-pandemic risks amplify challenges in maintaining state financial accountability. Consequently, strengthening public financial governance becomes an essential prerequisite to ensure that state expenditures deliver optimal benefits to society (Agustinus, 2013).

A fundamental paradox emerges when increasingly comprehensive governance infrastructure does not proportionally improve accountability. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2023 reveals that Indonesia's score has tended to decline since 2017, indicating that public sector corruption has not been optimally addressed (Widyastuty et al., 2022). Data from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) confirms that corruption cases in government institutions continued to increase during 2020–2023, with the highest incidence at the district/municipal level. This condition reflects a gap between the formal implementation of various oversight instruments and their substantive effectiveness in preventing misconduct (Koeswayo et al., 2024).

From an Islamic perspective, state financial accountability extends beyond formal governance mechanisms and regulatory compliance, encompassing moral and ethical obligations rooted in the concept of amanah (trust). Public officials are entrusted with managing public resources in a manner that ensures justice, transparency, and responsibility, while safeguarding public wealth (hifz al-mal) and promoting societal welfare (maslahah) (Farwell et al., 2019; Rashid et al., 2024). In this framework, governance failures such as corruption, inefficiency, or weak risk management may also reflect a lack of internalization of ethical values, where accountability is externally enforced rather than internally embedded. This perspective provides an additional lens to understand why formally established governance systems may not always translate into substantive accountability outcomes (Zaim et al., 2021).

In the context of public financial governance, the government has established at least four primary mechanisms. First, corruption control measured through the Corruption Control Effectiveness Index (IEPK). Second, the Government Internal Control System (SPIP) functioning as a mechanism for preventing misconduct and fraud. Third, risk management measured through the Risk Management Index (MRI). Fourth, the capability of Government Internal Auditors (APIP) measured through the Internal Audit Capability Model (IACM). These four mechanisms are assumed to work synergistically in strengthening accountability, yet empirical evidence regarding the relative effectiveness of each mechanism remains limited.

Prior studies have tended to analyze the influence of governance mechanisms in isolation. Handayani et al. (2020) examined the effect of SPIP on accountability, Mahama et al. (2020) highlighted the importance of risk management in public sector governance, while Kassem (2023) and Al Shbail et al. (2025) focused on internal audit capability. Such partial approaches overlook the possibility that governance mechanisms possess asymmetric effectiveness that is, not all mechanisms operate with equal effectiveness in driving accountability.

This literature gap becomes particularly significant in the Indonesian context, where BPKP data shows that despite MRI scores increasing progressively from an average of 1.2 (2021) to 2.877 (2024), such formal improvement does not necessarily reflect substantive internalization. This phenomenon relates to the concept of *decoupling* in Institutional Theory (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, n.d.), where formal organizational structures become detached from actual practices in response to institutional pressures. Fadjarenie & Susilowati (2019) study on leveraging blockchain technology for corruption prevention in public procurement demonstrates that control innovation requires not only formal infrastructure but also substantive integration with business processes.

Based on these theoretical and empirical gaps, this study poses a central question: why do governance mechanisms that have been formally established demonstrate differential effectiveness in driving state financial accountability? To answer this question, this study simultaneously tests the effects of IEPK, SPIP maturity, MRI, and IACM on accountability, while qualitatively exploring the implementation dynamics of each mechanism. A mixed-method convergent design is employed to generate understanding that not only explains statistical relationships but also reveals the causal mechanisms underlying quantitative findings.

2. Literature Review

Agency Theory and Oversight Mechanism Asymmetry

Agency Theory explains the contractual relationship between principals and agents that potentially generates conflicts of interest due to the separation of ownership and management, coupled with information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In the context of state finance, citizens as principals delegate public resource management to the government as agent, necessitating oversight mechanisms to ensure accountability. However, classical agency literature tends to treat oversight mechanisms homogeneously without differentiating their relative effectiveness.

This study extends the Agency Theory perspective by distinguishing two categories of oversight mechanisms: *enforcement mechanisms* that are active, actor-behavior-focused, and operate through detection and sanctions (such as IEPK and IACM); and *systemic prevention mechanisms* that are passive, system-design-focused, and operate through structural deterrence (such as SPIP and MRI). This distinction is critical because the relative effectiveness of these two mechanism categories on accountability has not been empirically tested in the Indonesian public sector context.

Institutional Theory and Ceremonial Isomorphism

Institutional Theory posits that organizations adopt formal structures and practices not solely to enhance efficiency, but to obtain legitimacy from the institutional environment. *Ceremonial isomorphism* occurs when organizations adopt certain practices formally while *decoupling* them from actual operational activities (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In the Indonesian government context, the implementation of risk management in ministries/agencies through regulations and BPKP assessments potentially creates conditions where organizations pursue high MRI scores as regulatory compliance requirements without substantively integrating risk management practices into decision-making.

Legitimacy Theory

Legitimacy Theory posits that organizations strive to ensure their activities are perceived as legitimate and consistent with social norms and expectations. In the context of state financial

e-ISSN: 2716-2605, p-ISSN 2721-0677
DOI: https:// https://doi.org/10.53515/lt.v8i1.180

accountability, the government internal audit function (APIP) serves as a legitimacy mechanism providing reasonable assurance over financial management propriety. Adequate internal auditor capability enhances credibility and public trust in government governance (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995).

Islamic Governance Perspective on Accountability

From an Islamic governance perspective, accountability is not solely grounded in contractual relationships or institutional legitimacy, but also in moral and spiritual responsibility. The concept of *amanah* (trust) emphasizes that public officials are entrusted with managing public resources in a responsible, transparent, and just manner. This trust extends beyond formal accountability mechanisms, as individuals are also accountable to higher ethical and spiritual principles (Hidayat et al., 2017; Lobah, 2016).

In this framework, the concept of *hisbah* represents a form of oversight that combines both external enforcement and internal moral control. While enforcement mechanisms such as audits, sanctions, and anti-corruption measures reflect formal *hisbah* practices, true accountability is achieved when these mechanisms are complemented by internalized ethical values. This perspective suggests that accountability systems relying solely on external enforcement may be effective in the short term but remain vulnerable to superficial compliance if not supported by intrinsic moral commitment (Fariz et al., 2020; Lobah, 2016).

Furthermore, the objective of governance in Islam aligns with the principle of *maqasid al-shariah*, particularly the protection of wealth (*hifz al-mal*) and the promotion of public welfare (*maslahah*) (Nurcahyani et al., 2025). Inefficiencies, corruption, and ineffective risk management may therefore be interpreted not only as governance failures but also as deviations from these foundational objectives (Munandar et al., 2025).

Integrating this perspective with existing theories provides a more comprehensive understanding of accountability. While Agency Theory explains accountability through principal–agent relationships, Islamic governance introduces a transcendental dimension in which agents are accountable not only to principals but also to ethical and spiritual values (Septiani et al., 2023). Similarly, Institutional Theory's concept of decoupling can be interpreted as a gap between formal structures and the internalization of values, while Legitimacy Theory can be extended to include moral legitimacy grounded in ethical conduct. This integrated perspective helps explain why certain governance mechanisms, particularly those based on enforcement, may appear more effective than preventive mechanisms that require deeper internalization.

Hypothesis Development

Corruption Control Effectiveness and Accountability

Effective corruption control represents the manifestation of enforcement mechanisms operating through regulation, transparency, and sanctions against fraudulent practices. Koeswayo et al. (2024) demonstrated that public governance aspects, including corruption control, significantly influence accountability perceptions. Le et al. (2021) confirmed that internal control systems and codes of conduct function as effective anti-corruption practices. Within the agency framework, effective corruption control reduces information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior, thereby enhancing accountability.

H_1: Corruption control effectiveness positively affects state financial accountability.

SPIP Maturity and Accountability

SPIP maturity reflects the maturity level of public organizations in implementing internal controls in an integrated manner. Based on Agency Theory, internal controls function to reduce information asymmetry and ensure financial management aligns with public interest. Al-Hazaima et al. (2020) and Rehman & Hashim (2021) demonstrated that effective internal control systems prevent fraud, mismanagement, and financial irregularities. Enhanced SPIP maturity is expected to strengthen the systemic foundation of accountability.

H_2: SPIP maturity positively affects state financial accountability.

Risk Management and Accountability

Integrated risk management implementation plays a critical role in identifying and mitigating risks that potentially impede organizational goal achievement. Bracci et al. (2022) and Crovini et al. (2022) affirm that risk management constitutes part of accountability practices toward stakeholders. However, various studies have also found that public sector risk management practices remain partial and oriented toward administrative compliance (Myeza et al., 2021; Rana et al., 2019). Although theoretically risk management should strengthen accountability, its effectiveness is highly contingent upon the degree of integration with organizational business processes.

H_3: Risk management positively affects state financial accountability.

APIP Capability and Accountability

APIP capability constitutes a strategic factor in ensuring oversight effectiveness and the quality of state financial reporting. (Al Shbail et al., 2025) demonstrated that adequate internal audit capability enhances audit quality. Within the Legitimacy Theory framework, competent internal auditors serve to maintain public trust and ensure state financial management conforms to applicable norms and standards. (Sumiyana et al., 2025) identified that the transformation of APIP from watchdog to strategic partner represents a prerequisite for public sector accountability enhancement.

H_4: Internal auditor capability positively affects state financial accountability.

3. Methodology

This study employs a *mixed-method convergent design* (Cresswell, 2019) that combines quantitative and qualitative methods in parallel within a single research phase, subsequently integrating results at the final stage through a *joint display matrix*. The quantitative approach uses panel data regression to test the causal effects of independent variables on accountability. The qualitative approach employs in-depth interviews to explore implementation dynamics and reveal mechanisms underlying statistical findings.

The research population encompasses all Ministries and Agencies (K/L) in Indonesia. Purposive sampling was applied with the following criteria: (1) K/L that consistently prepared financial statements during 2021–2024; and (2) K/L that prepared Government Performance Accountability Reports (LKjIP) during the same period. From 87 K/L, five were excluded due to liquidation since 2022 and one did not prepare LKjIP, yielding 81 K/L as the sample (N = 324 observations over 4 years).

Quantitative data were sourced from official reports of BPKP (IEPK, SPIP maturity, MRI, and IACM), BPK RI (financial statement audit opinions), and the Ministry of Administrative Reform (AKIP scores). Qualitative data were obtained through in-depth interviews with six key informants from the Ministry of Finance (3 informants), BPKP, KPK, and the Ministry of Administrative Reform who hold strategic roles in state financial governance.

e-ISSN: 2716-2605, p-ISSN 2721-0677
DOI: https:// https://doi.org/10.53515/lt.v8i1.180

Table 1. Variable Operationalization

Variable	Indicator	Scale	Source
IEPK (X1)	Corruption control maturity level (1–5)	Ordinal	BPKP
SPIP Maturity (X2)	Internal control system maturity level (1–5)	Ordinal	BPKP
MRI (X3)	Risk management maturity level (1–5)	Ordinal	BPKP
IACM (X4)	Internal auditor capability level (1–5)	Ordinal	BPKP
Accountability (Y)	Combined BPK audit opinion + AKIP score (scale 1–5.5)	Interval	BPK, MenPAN-RB

Source: Author's own elaboration (2026)

Quantitative analysis employed panel data regression with optimal model selection through the Chow test and Hausman test. Classical assumption tests included normality (Jarque-Bera), heteroscedasticity (White), multicollinearity (VIF), and autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson). Hypothesis testing was conducted through the F-test, t-test, and coefficient of determination at the 5% significance level.

Qualitative analysis employed Miles and Huberman's interactive model through coding processes assisted by NVivo 11.0. Validity was tested through source triangulation and theoretical triangulation. Analysis techniques encompassed matrix coding, cluster analysis (Pearson Correlation Coefficient), word frequency query, hierarchy chart, and crosstab query. Integration of quantitative-qualitative findings was conducted through a joint display matrix with convergence, complementarity, and divergence pattern classification.

4. Results and Discussion

Quantitative Findings

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistical results indicate that K/L governance attainment remains at a developing stage with varying maturity levels. The average IEPK of 1.75 shows K/L are still at the early stage of corruption control strengthening. SPIP maturity averages 2.91, approaching Level 3 (defined), indicating most K/L have established a relatively sound internal control framework. The average MRI of 2.06 shows risk management remains at the repeatable stage and is not yet integrated. APIP capability averages 2.71, approaching Level 3, indicating adequate internal oversight functioning. Accountability averages 3.983 out of a maximum scale of 5.5, reflecting a relatively high accountability level.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Annual Trends

Variable	Mean	SD	2021	2022	2023	2024	Trend
IEPK (X1)	1.75	1.318	1.00	1.50	2.20	2.69	↑

SPIP (X2)	2.91	0.489	2.82	2.88	2.87	3.03	↔
MRI (X3)	2.06	1.266	1.20	2.00	2.60	2.88	↑
IACM (X4)	2.71	0.679	2.65	2.45	2.66	3.04	↔
Y (Accountability)	3.983	0.790	4.17	4.31	4.33	4.38	↑

Source: Author's calculation (2026)

The most significant descriptive finding concerns the MRI variable: despite scores increasing progressively from 1.20 (2021) to 2.877 (2024), this formal improvement becomes anomalous when compared with hypothesis testing results showing MRI has no significant effect on accountability. This phenomenon indicates the occurrence of *decoupling* — formal score improvement does not reflect substantive integration within organizational processes.

Panel Data Regression Results

Optimal model selection through the Chow test indicated the Fixed Effect Model (FEM) was more appropriate than the Common Effect Model, and the Hausman test confirmed FEM was more consistent than the Random Effect Model. The FEM yielded an Adjusted R-Squared of 0.6315, explaining 63.15% of accountability variation.

Table 3. Hypothesis Testing Results - Fixed Effect Model

Variable	**Coefficient**	**t-stat**	**Prob.**	**Category**	**Decision**
IEPK (X_1)	+0.095	2.56	0.011*	*Enforcement*	**H_1 Supported**
SPIP (X_2)	+0.227	2.51	0.013*	*Prevention*	**H_2 Supported**
MRI (X_3)	−0.026	−0.58	0.565	*Prevention*	**H_3** Not Supported
IACM (X_4)	+0.249	3.73	0.000**	*Enforcement*	**H_4 Supported**

*Notes: * significant at α = 5%; ** significant at α = 1%; Adj. R^2 = 0.6315; F-prob = 0.0000*

Source: Author's calculation (2026)

Hypothesis testing results reveal a clear asymmetric pattern: both mechanisms categorized as *enforcement* (IEPK and IACM) demonstrate positive and significant effects, while of the two systemic *prevention* mechanisms, only SPIP is significant whereas MRI is not. These findings indicate that mechanisms operating through active detection and sanctions against actor behavior are more effective than mechanisms relying on preventive system design, particularly risk management that has not been internalized.

Qualitative Findings

Qualitative data validity was tested through source triangulation using cluster similarity analysis. All inter-informant correlation coefficients exceeded 0.60 (lowest 0.600 between KPK-BPKP; highest 0.766 between Ministry of Finance informants), confirming adequate data credibility.

e-ISSN: 2716-2605, p-ISSN 2721-0677
DOI: https:// https://doi.org/10.53515/lt.v8i1.180

Dominance of Enforcement Mechanisms

Word frequency query analysis consistently identified "KPK" as the most dominant word across all qualitative research questions (1.43–1.84%). Cluster analysis revealed strong correlations between "influential factors" and "corruption case reduction" themes (r = 0.843), and between corruption reduction and financial management (r = 0.728). Informants from various institutions independently emphasized that accountability is more determined by active oversight effectiveness, leadership integrity (tone at the top), and consistent law enforcement than by the completeness of formal systems.

Confirmation of Risk Management Decoupling

Qualitative findings provide a critical explanation for why MRI is not quantitatively significant. *Cluster analysis* shows that the SPI–risk management correlation is only moderate (r = 0.541), indicating both systems are not yet integrated. *Crosstab query* results show risk management was relatively the least discussed by informants compared to other variables, confirming this aspect remains the weakest point of implementation. Informants identified that risk management is conducted in silos and oriented toward administrative compliance (fulfilling BPKP assessments) without substantive integration into financial decision-making processes.

SPIP as an Enabling Condition

Despite being quantitatively significant, qualitative findings indicate SPIP is perceived by informants as a systemic foundation or baseline system that is "taken for granted." SPIP is not a primary differentiating factor in reducing corruption, but rather a basic prerequisite enabling active oversight mechanisms to function effectively. This pattern explains why SPIP's coefficient (β = +0.227) carries less substantive impact than its statistical value alone might suggest.

Integrated Findings: Joint Display Matrix

Table 4. Joint Display Matrix - Findings Convergence

Variable	**Quantitative**	**Qualitative**	**Integration Pattern**	**Interpretation**
IEPK (Enforcement)	Positive, significant	KPK dominant (1.43–1.84%); inter-theme correlation >0.7; enforcement as primary factor	**Strong Convergence**	Active sanctions proven effective statistically and perceptually
SPIP (Prevention)	Positive, significant	Perceived as "foundation" and "baseline system" already given	**Complementary**	Enabling condition, not primary driver
MRI (Prevention)	Not significant	SPI-MR correlation moderate (0.541); siloed; compliance formality; least discussed	**Negative Convergence**	*Decoupling* — formal adoption without substantive integration

IACM (Enforcement)	Positive, highly significant	"Auditor," "APIP," "oversight" consistently dominant; strategic role acknowledged	**Strong Convergence**	Strongest determinant through assurance and advisory functions

Source: Author's elaboration (2026)

Discussion: Enforcement-Prevention Asymmetry

Integration of quantitative and qualitative findings reveals a pattern this study terms *Enforcement-Prevention Asymmetry* the finding that governance mechanisms operating through active detection and sanctions against actor behavior (enforcement) are systematically more effective in driving accountability than mechanisms relying on preventive system design (prevention). This asymmetric pattern carries important theoretical implications for Agency Theory. Classical agency literature Jensen & Meckling, (1976) assumes that monitoring mechanisms work uniformly in reducing conflicts of interest between principals and agents. This study's findings demonstrate that this assumption does not fully hold in the Indonesian public sector context. Enforcement mechanisms (IEPK and IACM) that focus on individual actor behavior through corruption investigation, risk-based auditing, and advisory functions are more effective because they create direct accountability for financial management actors. Conversely, systemic prevention mechanisms (particularly MRI) that operate through procedural design and organizational frameworks are more susceptible to ceremonial compliance because they lack direct sanctioning mechanisms over individual behavior.

The non-significance of MRI is reinforced by the Institutional Theory framework. Data shows MRI scores increased sharply from 1.20 (2021) to 2.877 (2024), yet this formal improvement does not contribute to accountability. This phenomenon precisely illustrates *ceremonial isomorphism* Meyer & Rowan (1977) where K/L adopt risk management formally to fulfill BPKP assessment demands and obtain regulatory legitimacy, without substantively integrating it into decision-making processes. Qualitative confirmation that risk management remains "siloed" and "administrative" reinforces this *decoupling* interpretation.

The significance of SPIP as the only prevention mechanism that demonstrates an effect indicates SPIP has transcended the ceremonial phase and achieved a more substantive level of internalization compared to MRI. This can be explained by SPIP's longer implementation history (since Government Regulation No. 60 of 2008) and its direct linkage to BPK audit opinions as a financial accountability indicator. SPIP functions as an enabling condition providing the foundation for enforcement mechanisms to operate effectively, forming a tiered governance model where SPIP serves as the base layer, enforcement as the primary driver, and risk management as unrealized reinforcement potential.

From an Islamic governance perspective, this asymmetry between enforcement and prevention mechanisms can be interpreted as a reflection of the dominance of external accountability over internalized ethical responsibility. The effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms aligns with the concept of hisbah, where oversight, monitoring, and sanctions are applied to ensure compliance and deter misconduct. However, the limited effectiveness of preventive mechanisms, particularly risk management, suggests that accountability has not yet been fully internalized as amanah (trust) among public officials (Muhammad et al., 2022).

In this context, the phenomenon of decoupling identified in this study may also be viewed as a form of ethical decoupling, where formal governance structures exist without corresponding

e-ISSN: 2716-2605, p-ISSN 2721-0677
DOI: https:// https://doi.org/10.53515/lt.v8i1.180

internal commitment to ethical values. Preventive systems such as risk management require not only procedural implementation but also the internalization of responsibility, integrity, and anti-israf (anti-wastefulness) behavior (Lobah, 2016). Without this internal dimension, such systems are more likely to function symbolically rather than substantively. Furthermore, the role of SPIP as an enabling condition may indicate that systemic controls can support accountability only when complemented by both effective enforcement (hisbah) and internalized moral commitment (amanah). This perspective extends the interpretation of Enforcement-Prevention Asymmetry by suggesting that the long-term effectiveness of governance mechanisms depends not only on their structural design but also on the extent to which ethical values are embedded within organizational behavior (Maali & Napier, 2010).

Conclusion

This study yields three principal findings that provide substantive contributions to public financial governance theory and practice. First, it identifies an Enforcement-Prevention Asymmetry in state financial accountability. Enforcement mechanisms, namely internal auditor (APIP) capability and corruption control effectiveness, are proven to have positive and significant effects, while risk management as a systemic prevention mechanism shows no significant effect. Second, this study reveals a risk management decoupling phenomenon in Indonesian ministries and agencies. Despite formal MRI scores increasing significantly during 2021–2024, this improvement does not contribute to accountability because the implementation remains characterized by ceremonial isomorphism adopting frameworks to fulfill regulatory demands without substantive internalization into business processes. Third, SPIP maturity demonstrates a positive and significant effect, functioning as an enabling condition that provides the systemic foundation for enforcement mechanisms to operate effectively rather than acting as the primary driver of accountability.

Theoretically, this study offers four key contributions. It enriches Agency Theory by empirically distinguishing the effectiveness of enforcement versus prevention mechanisms in public sector oversight, challenging the assumption of monitoring mechanism homogeneity. It confirms Institutional Theory through empirical evidence of ceremonial isomorphism, where formal risk management adoption does not yield substantive integration. It supports Legitimacy Theory by highlighting APIP capability as an assurance legitimacy mechanism that enhances governance credibility. Furthermore, it extends the discourse on Islamic public finance by framing the enforcement-prevention gap as a manifestation of ethical decoupling, demonstrating that accountability mechanisms without the internalization of *amanah* (trust) operate merely at a ceremonial level.

Practically, these findings indicate that BPKP and policymakers must transform the risk management assessment paradigm from formal compliance evaluation toward assessing substantive integration within organizational business processes. For ministries and agencies, strengthening APIP capability from a watchdog role toward a strategic partner represents the investment with the greatest impact on accountability. For law enforcement agencies like the KPK, these findings confirm the critical importance of maintaining and strengthening the enforcement function as the primary determinant of state financial accountability. Furthermore, institutional leaders must champion cultural engineering initiatives that integrate technical risk management with ethical and spiritual capacity building to effectively combat ceremonial compliance.

This study is not without limitations. The variable measurements rely on aggregate ordinal scales from institutional assessments, limiting the capture of implementation variation at the work-unit level. The four-year observation period (2021–2024) may not fully capture the long-term effects of governance reforms, and the qualitative analysis is currently limited to informants from central oversight institutions. Future research should employ longer longitudinal designs to identify the critical transition point from ceremonial to substantive adoption and develop measurement instruments that differentiate between formal adoption and actual integration. Expanding the qualitative sample to operational-level implementors and conducting cross-country comparisons would also provide a more granular understanding of the decoupling mechanisms. Ultimately, the identified asymmetry suggests that current accountability systems remain predominantly externally driven resembling formal *hisbah* (external enforcement) practices relying heavily on monitoring and sanctions. Future governance reforms must, therefore, integrate structural accountability with intrinsic moral responsibility, fostering *amanah* and anti-*israf* (anti-wastefulness) behavior, to achieve a more substantive, sustainable, and value-based public financial governance.

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e-ISSN: 2716-2605, p-ISSN 2721-0677
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